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This opinion responds to the commentary by Papeo and Caramazza (2014).
The mechanisms through which our brain generates, stores, and invokes complex semantic
representations, such as those used in language, remain unknown. One key question is whether the
basic brain structures controlling movements and perceptions directly participate in higher-order
cognitive processes. Their involvement in semantic representations of individual words is therefore
hotly debated in current literature. Clarifying the mechanisms of this involvement was the goal of
our previous research (Shtyrov et al., 2014), critically analyzed by the above commentary. Using
magnetoencephalography, we found ultra-rapid (commencing ∼80ms after the disambiguation
point) activations and deactivations in the motor cortex (defined non-invasively using MRI
and localizer task in MEG) in response to unattended action-related verbs and nouns, with
words related to different body-parts (kick, swallow, throw) selectively activating corresponding
somatotopic representations, while suppressing word-incompatible motor representations. In our
view, these instant activation patterns, which emerged for different words types in the absence of
focused attention on the stimuli, advocate automatic involvement of sensorimotor circuits in word
comprehension.
Among other things, the above commentary raises a range of important questions:
• It rightly identifies the timing as a crucial feature of the effects discovered. However, it criticizes
the timing of the effects as being locked to the disambiguation points, rather than word onsets.
• The earliness of semantic effects is questioned for being simultaneous with acoustic-sensory
processes.
• The critique assumes that the disambiguation point only disambiguates grammatical class,
but not semantic content. After re-calculating the effects to the word onset, the commentary
concludes that they are post-comprehension.
• A question is raised with respect to the motor system involvement in referentially underspecified
use of action language.
Below, we highlight important considerations related to these neurolinguistic experimental issues:
(I) The timing of the effects as stemming from the word disambiguation/recognition points is
indeed a crucial feature that should, in our view, be implemented in any neurolinguistic
experiment. Often in such experiments, large stimulus sets are compared, with average
responses being used to make conclusions on all words of a certain category. First, this creates
physical stimulus variance, when different stimulus types have diverging physical features
(duration, frequency, etc.); this is especially difficult to control in the auditory modality when
spoken stimuli unfold over time with different dynamics. Differences even in basic physical
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features may lead to differential brain activation (Näätänen
and Picton, 1987) that could overlap with, mask, cancel,
or be misinterpreted as language-related effects. Second,
this creates psycholinguistic variance, when stimuli diverge
in their linguistic features, including word recognition
parameters in spoken words. The latter may be especially
difficult to control, as different words become uniquely
recognized at different times, in extreme cases shortly after
their onset or only after a substantial post-offset period
(Marslen-Wilson, 1987). The conventional approach of
matching average parameters across stimulus categories
can help mitigate these problems, but still has a caveat:
for any small and short-lived effects (as all known
early ERP peaks are, as well as any transient effects
outside local maxima), the variance in the stimulus group
may reduce or even remove any effects in the average
responses, particularly if time-locked to the word onset.
While later deflections (e.g., N400, P600) are smeared
by such averaging but, being large in amplitude and
long-lasting, still survive it, this strategy could be fatal
for capturing the earliest short-lived transient small-scale
activity. Therefore, to capture the entire neural dynamics
of language processing, it is important to (1) maximally
reduce stimulus variance, e.g., by using a fixed set of tightly
controlled stimuli, and (2) time-lock electrophysiological
response to key psycholinguistic markers in the auditory
stream, most importantly—to the point in time, when the
available information allows for differentiating the stimulus
from other similar sounds and, ultimately, for identifying it.
The commentary specifies the time of “∼200ms after
the word onset” as an upper limit for considering motor
system’s involvement in comprehension as direct. While
200ms is indeed often considered the borderline between
initial automatic and late top-down controlled stages of
language processing, we argue that, for spoken words, it
is not “after the word onset” that this timing should
be calculated from. In fact, 200ms is approximately the
duration of one short CV-syllable usually devoid of any
meaning. Instead, more linguistically relevant timemarkers
should be used, such as the word recognition point
when the information available is sufficient for confident
identification, or at least the disambiguation point, when
the perceptual input noticeably diverges between a few
competitors.
A few studies illustrate the efficiency of this approach.
For example, in a study using large groups of words
and pseudowords in an N400 design, no reliable lexical
effects were found when time-locking ERPs to the
word onsets (Friedrich et al., 2006). However, when
ERPs were realigned to disambiguation points, marked
N400 effects were found—moreover, they commenced
already before 200ms. In another recent study comparing
groups of words and pseudowords, the tight control
over recognition points led to the discovery of transient
neuromagnetic lexicality effects around 50–80ms that
cannot be easily identified otherwise (MacGregor et al.,
2012).
(II) The commentary questions the earliness of semantic
effects based on the assumption that these latencies
are associated with sensory acoustic analysis. True,
acoustic variables can still influence brain responses
at these latencies (e.g., loudness effects on N100 are
well known), but the extraction of acoustic features
commences much earlier. Acoustic information transfer
from the cochlea to temporal neocortex only takes ∼10–
20ms (Eldredge and Miller, 1971; Rupp et al., 2002)
with basic acoustic feature extraction taking place at
20–50ms (Krumbholz et al., 2003; Lutkenhoner et al.,
2003). Even the earliest marked cortical deflections
around ∼50ms (in the P50/P1 range) have been linked
to higher-level cognitive information processing (Palva
et al., 2002; Yadon et al., 2009; MacGregor et al., 2012,
2014). Crucially, P50 generators (at least as defined by
non-invasive neuroimaging tools) are distributed beyond
primary auditory areas, including parietal, cingulate, and
frontal associative cortices (Boutros et al., 2013) refuting
the possibility that it merely reflects an acoustic feature
extraction stage. Interestingly, to support the notion
of sensory-only processing at sub-100ms latencies the
commentary cites a seminal review by Friederici (2002);
the very same research group have, however, published
a series of studies claiming high-level syntactic processes
already at 40–60ms (e.g., Herrmann et al., 2009, 2011a,b).
Combined, this evidence suggests that one should not
be surprised by semantic effects as late as 80–120ms.
In fact, the available conduction time estimates and
electrophysiological findings suggest that the earliest
linguistically-relevant cortical processes might commence
around 30–60ms.
(III) The commentary assumes that the disambiguation point
only disambiguated the stimulus’s grammatical category
(verb/noun) but not semantics, and that the semantic
information is available much earlier, already during
the stimulus onset. This is a misunderstanding of
crucial experimental design features. The vast majority
of stimuli were meaningless pseudowords fully sharing
their onsets with the critical verbs and nouns. Thus,
if the semantic information were available during the
onset, the similar semantically-specific motor activations
should also take place for the frequent pseudowords as,
up to the disambiguation point, they were identical to
the words. This clearly did not happen: motor-cortex
effects were only present for the real words after they
became distinct from the meaningless fillers. The reported
effects were found in the difference response between
activation to rarely presented (“deviant”) words and
frequent (“standard”) pseudowords, i.e., the mismatch
negativity component triggered by a contrast between
them1. There was no sufficient semantic information
in the onsets to identify the meaning of either word
1The mismatch negativity paradigm is a sensitive tool for registering word-
specific memory-trace activations while strictly controlling for acoustic factors
by employing identical standard-deviant acoustic contrasts in different contexts;
(Pulvermüller and Shtyrov, 2006; Näätänen et al., 2007).
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before the disambiguation point: not only could these
onsets end as meaningless pseudowords, but the onsets
themselves have either no meaning if presented standalone
or carry a meaning unrelated to the full form (therefore,
the analogy “br3s” = “throw-” in the commentary
is incorrect). In principle (although less relevant in a
repetitive oddball design), these onsets also have numerous
other completions unrelated semantically to the stimulus
words. Taken together, these factors rule out any certain
identification of semantics before the disambiguation
point.
As mentioned, the commentary relies on a sequential
model of language comprehension, which considers
latencies before 100ms sensory-related (Friederici,
2002). The very same model, however, also suggested
that semantic information is only processed at
300–500ms, in line with M350 and N400 research
(Embick et al., 2001; Stockall et al., 2004; Kutas
and Federmeier, 2011). Thus, even if the logic of
recalculating brain responses to the word onset were
correct and the effects were indeed in the classical
N400 time range, the very same classical framework
would place them together with the rest of lexico-
semantic dynamics, and not with post-comprehension
phenomena.
Crucially, other studies have also indicated early motor
cortex involvement in word comprehension. We will
not repeat reviews of such findings (e.g., Pulvermüller
and Fadiga, 2010), but would instead like to highlight
the importance of investigations using visual word
presentation. Auditory modality (the “native” modality
of the language function) presents experimenters with
serious challenges as the stimulus unfolds in time and the
amount of available acoustic and linguistic information
changes continuously and rapidly. In contrast to this,
in the visual domain, sensory information about the
word is available instantaneously in its entirety. Using
visually-presented words could therefore help disentangle
the earliest stages of neural word access, by avoiding
the complications of time-locking brain responses to
dynamically changing input. Indeed, visual word reading
investigations using EEG and MEG suggested early (within
200ms after the word onset) activation of the motor system
in semantic access (Hauk and Pulvermüller, 2004; Hauk
et al., 2008; Boulenger et al., 2012), even for action words of
participants’ second language (Vukovic and Shtyrov, 2014).
Although satisfying the 200-ms threshold, these latencies
are substantially later than the sub-100ms dynamics under
discussion. This could be explained by various factors.
First, information transfer from the visual system to
the temporo-frontal core language network may lead to
inevitable delays in language-circuitry activations. Second,
previous visual investigations focused largely on ERP/ERF
peaks, whereas we scrutinized time periods outside local
maxima—and our effects were, indeed, found before the
absolute response peak. Third, in the auditory modality
one cannot exclude a degree of predictive processing when
word-initial information allows partial pre-activation of
corresponding memory traces before word completion, as
suggested by the Cohort model of speech comprehension
(Marslen-Wilson and Tyler, 1980); this latter possibility
also partially aligns with the commentators’ critique of our
findings.
(IV) Papeo and Caramazza raise an important question of
underspecifiedmotor semantics (“throw a party”).Whereas
the original study was not set up to address modality-
specific brain systems’ involvement in the comprehension
of metaphoric or idiomatic language, the “embodied
cognition” framework does not refute the existence
of representations without a direct motor (or another
modality-specific) reference as such; one example could
be function words. On the other hand, words are
naturally acquired in the context of experiencing the
objects, actions and concepts they represent. This, in
the Hebbian associative learning framework, leads to
establishing distributed cortical representations which
may therefore include modality-specific structures. Once
established, nothing prevents the use of these circuits
for a variety of purposes whenever the word they
represent is called upon. This may include non-literal
use of action words such as in “throw a party,” “kick
the bucket,” or “swallow one’s pride,” with obscure or
even absent action connotation. There is, however, a
dearth of studies on this topic. At least one MEG
experiment suggested early (150–200ms) activation of the
motor system in idiom comprehension (Boulenger et al.,
2012). Further investigations are essential to answer the
question of modality-specific contributions to language
comprehension in non-literal contexts.
Finally, the commentary appears to have missed a
crucial element of our experimental design: the attention-
distraction paradigm. The participants were asked to
concentrate on non-linguistic visual input and ignore the
sounds; no linguistic task or any word-related activities
were required. While this design does not fully prevent a
degree of active word processing, this removal of stimulus-
related task and even attention on stimuli does minimize
the risk on covert imagery or simulation necessary for late
post-comprehension processes to take place. A number
of studies that manipulated attention on linguistic stimuli
indicated that the earliest stages of language processing
are automatic and largely resilient to top-down control
(Hahne and Friederici, 1999; Pulvermüller et al., 2008;
Garagnani et al., 2009; Shtyrov, 2010; Kimppa et al., 2015).
Further investigations are needed in order to validate this
automaticity explicitly in the lexical semantics domain,
for example, by manipulating task demands and attention
levels.
On a more general note, we should also point out that
most of data currently available on the subject (including
the study under discussion) are based, with exception of
a handful of patient studies, on non-invasive measures of
brain activity whose neuroanatomical precision remains
limited. Thus, further research is necessary to validate
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tentative motor cortical generators active in semantic
processing using more precise tools, such as direct
electocorticography recordings (ECoG). Such experiments
(e.g., Mesgarani et al., 2014; Steinschneider et al., 2014)
are becoming instrumental in detailing rapid cortical
timecourse of language comprehension (including the
motor cortex involvement in speech perception, Chang
et al., 2011); their extension to studies of cortical dynamics
related to (motor) semantics is a fruitful future direction.
In conclusion, we would like to stress the importance
of experimental investigations into the language
comprehension timecourse and of fruitful theoretical
debates of the kind sparkled by the commentators, to whom
we are grateful for a critical and focused discussion of our
findings. Fast neuroimaging modalities are indispensable in
comprehensive investigations of this timecourse. For these
investigations to be meaningful, the issue of time-locking
must be taken into account most rigorously. Precisely
defining and orthogonally modulating acoustic onsets
and offsets, physical make-up, disambiguation and word
recognition points, as well as validating any effects using
different modalities of stimulation (auditory, visual) and
data acquisition (MEG, EEG, ECoG, TMS, f/sMRI, and
their combinations) are, in our view, a prerequisite for the
success of future neurolinguistic experiments.
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